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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Fisher v. University of Texas (Fisher II ) 1 
marks the first time Justice Anthony Kennedy has ruled in favor of a racial  
 
 Professor of Law, James P. Bradley Chair in Constitutional Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; 
B.A., Duke University; J.D., Yale Law School. I wish to thank Jonathan Glater and the participants in 
the University of California, Irvine School of Law Symposium on Higher Education Access for their insights, 
comments, and support of this project. I would also like to express my deep appreciation to my research 
assistants Michaela Goldstein, Jadai Hamilton, Mary Polk, and Neil Richmond. Very special thanks to 
the editors of the UC Irvine Law Review for their excellent editorial assistance. 
 1. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II ) , 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016), aff’g 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(2013). 
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affirmative action policy in the twenty-eight years he has served on the Court.2 The 
Fisher II decision should be understood as both the affirmative action case that 
supporters of affirmative action could not afford to lose and the case that shows 
just how much its opponents have already won. The case epitomizes the reversed 
state of the Court’s current equal protection jurisprudence after multiple decades of 
sustained attacks on racial affirmative action.3 It also exemplifies the Court’s 
willingness to afford reverse race discrimination claimants the greatest protection 
possible—by applying the most stringent level of judicial review—and traditional 
race discrimination claimants virtually none.4 Although the Supreme Court 
ultimately found no equal protection violation,5 its solicitous approach to  
evaluating Abigail Fisher’s reverse discrimination claim demonstrates how  
reversed equal protection jurisprudence has become. Reverse discrimination  
plaintiffs like Fisher receive doctrinal super-empathy from the Court while  
traditional race discrimination claims are treated with doctrinal super-apathy even if 
the policy in question substantially favors whites.6 
 
 2. Ariane de Vogue, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Evolution on Affirmative Action, CNN POLITICS 
( June 23, 2016, 2:21 PM) http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/23/politics/supreme-court-anthony-
kennedy-affirmative-action/ [https://perma.cc/H7EN-PPFV]. It is indeed notable that Fisher II 
was the first time that Justice Kennedy found a race-conscious remedy to be within  
the bounds of the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I ) , 133  
S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 3. Here, I am referring to the Court’s failure to treat statistically significant and racially  
disparate impact against nonwhites as racial classifications triggering heightened scrutiny absent proof 
of discriminatory intent under the doctrine set forth in cases like Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976), Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), and McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 
(1987), at the same time has demonstrated a willingness to treat any race-conscious policy, whether or 
not it constitutes an effective racial affirmative action policy, as a racial classification. See, e.g., Fisher II, 
136 S. Ct. 2198; Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411; J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469; Regents of Univ. of  
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 4. I am of the view that what makes an equal protection claim a “reverse discrimination” as 
opposed to a traditional discrimination claim is the fact that the plaintiff is challenging  
the constitutionality of an affirmative action policy or other policy designed to promote racial  
inclusiveness of historically excluded racial groups. 
 5. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215. 
 6. In this article, I have compiled and analyzed the overall numerical admissions outcomes and 
admission rates for the Texas Ten Percent Plan and holistic review 2008 UT applicants by racial 
group—data that was not compiled nor presented by the parties in the Fisher case and, thus, not  
considered by the courts that ruled on the merits of the Fisher lawsuit. See Kimberly West-Faulcon,  
Forsaking Claims of Merit: The Advance of Race-Blindness Entitlement in Fisher v. Texas, in 29 CIVIL 
RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 335, 353 (Steven Saltzman ed., 
2013). The admission rate for white applicants was 22.3% whereas the admission rates for African 
American and Latino applicants were a much lower 8.8% and 10.4%, respectively. See infra Figure 2 and 
accompanying text. 
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The fact that the University of Texas at Austin (UT)’s7 race-conscious  
“holistic review”8 policy had a statistically and legally significant racially  
discriminatory effect on African American and Latino applicants failed to be raised 
during any stage of the Fisher I and Fisher II litigation. This Article fills that gap 
with analysis of UT selection rates by race that shows how wildly inappropriate it 
was for Abigail Fisher to challenge UT’s minimal consideration of race as reverse 
discrimination. It also explains that, even though Justice Kennedy correctly 
recognized that the manner in which UT considered race satisfied strict scrutiny,9 
Fisher II is nevertheless emblematic of reversed protection.10 
The key justification for applying strict scrutiny to racial affirmative action  
policies—to protect members of non-beneficiary racial groups from  
unfairness—is totally inapt to the facts in the Fisher case. This Article’s analysis of 
UT selection rates by race shows that white (and Asian American11) applicants were 
selected at a significantly higher rate than African American and Latino  
 
 7. The Court accepted UT’s categorization of its use of race as but “a factor of a factor of a 
factor” in UT’s holistic review. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207 (citation omitted). Moreover, race could be 
considered positively for applicants of any race and the limited consideration of race was not a  
mandatory factor for any individual applicant: 
[A]lthough admissions officers can consider race as a positive feature of a minority student’s 
application, there is no dispute the race is but a “factor of a factor of a factor” in the holistic-
review calculus. 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 608 (W.D. Tex. 2009). Furthermore, consideration of 
race is contextual and does not operate as a mechanical plus factor for underrepresented 
minorities. Id. at 606 (“Plaintiffs cite no evidence to show racial groups other than African-
Americans and Hispanics are excluded from benefitting from UT’s consideration of race in 
admissions.”). 
Id. 
  8. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205. 
  9. See id. at 19. This conclusion was unexpected based on Kennedy’s Fisher I opinion. In Fisher 
I, Kennedy essentially admonished the lower court for not applying strict scrutiny strictly enough. See 
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. Given how regularly critics mischaracterize restrained racial affirmative 
action policies as conferring large-scale racial preferences, Fisher II’s accuracy in its factual analysis of 
UT’s policy is noteworthy and significant. An exaggerated and apocryphal version of UT’s race-
conscious holistic review was presented by various Fisher amici present in their  
briefs and public commentary. See, e.g., Gail Heriot, A “Dubious Expediency”: How Race- 
Preferential Admissions Policies on Campus Hurt Minority Students, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 
(Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/08/a-dubious-expediency-how-
race-preferential-admissions-policies-on-campus-hurt-minority-students [https://perma.cc/5ZY5-
VHAW] (describing the facts in the 1978 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke case); Brief for Richard 
Sander & Stuart Taylor as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411; Brief for 
Richard Sander & Stuart Taylor as Amici Curiae in Supporting of Neither Party, Fisher, 758 F.3d 633 
(5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3682 (U.S. June 29, 2015) (No. 14-981). 
 10. Russell Robinson has described the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence as “unequal 
protection.” See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 154 (2016) (noting that 
“[d]uring the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has steadily diminished the vigor of the Equal  
Protection Clause in most respects. It has turned away people of color . . . because their oppression 
does not take the form of a ‘racial classification’”) (citing McClesky, 481 U.S. 279). My point here  
is similar. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in  
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1471 (2004). 
   11. See Kimberly West-Faulcon, Obscuring Asian Penalty with Illusions of Black Bonus, 64 
UCLA L. REV. DISC. 590 (2017). 
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students the year Abigail Fisher applied for admission12—a factual scenario  
consistent with a legally cognizable degree of adverse impact against African  
Americans and Latinos under Title VI disparate impact law.13 
  Part I of the Article sets forth admissions data by race, my calculations of 
selection rates, and racial disparate impact analysis for UT’s Fall 2008 admissions 
cycle,14 showing that the disparity between the white selection rate and the African 
American and Latino selection rates was more than large enough to prove a prima 
facie case of discrimination under Title VI disparate impact law.15 Part II presents 
significant but neglected factual details about UT’s race-conscious holistic review 
process, such as the major role that SAT scores played in that component of  
admissions. It also critiques Justice Kennedy’s use of strict scrutiny in reviewing 
UT’s admissions policy as the application of doctrinal rules that have improperly 
reversed the protection conferred by the Equal Protection Clause.16 In conclusion, 
I suggest the lesson from Fisher II is that the Court should impose a discriminatory 
effect requirement on claims of reverse discrimination that mirrors the effect 
requirement17 the Court already imposes on traditional discrimination plaintiffs.18 
 
 12. This point is different from the observation that UT’s consideration of race did not  
negatively affect the admission chances of Abigail Fisher, individually. UT admitted members of 
historically poorly represented racial groups at lower rates than the two racial groups already well-
represented among students applying, admitted, and enrolled at UT. To be considered effective, a racial 
affirmative action policy should have some positive discernable impact on the selection rates of 
members of racial groups in the numerical minority of applying, admitted, and enrolled students as 
compared to selection rates of members of racial groups who comprise the vast majority of the students 
applying, selected, and enrolling. A university’s affirmative action policy has failed to operate effectively 
if, like UT’s policy, it fails to significantly increase racial group inclusion—if members of historically 
poorly represented racial groups are admitted at significantly lower rates than whites. 
  13. Section 601 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, provides that “[n]o person in the United States 
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). U.S. Department of Education regulations promulgated to 
enforce Title VI set forth the “specific discriminatory actions” that recipients of federal funds must 
avoid. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (2008). 
 14. This admissions rate and disparate impact analysis was not presented by either party in the 
Fisher I case, and the Court’s analysis in Fisher II erroneously relied on enrollment data rather than 
admissions data to evaluate holistic review outcomes. I filed an amicus curiae brief providing this 
analysis to the Court. See generally Brief of Kimberly West-Faulcon as Amicus Curiae Supporting  
Respondents, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 [hereinafter West-Faulcon, Fisher I Amicus Brief ]. 
 15. See infra text accompanying note 63 (explaining requirements for proving a Title VI 
disparate impact prima facie case of discrimination). 
 16. By “racially inclusive purpose,” I mean a policy that considers race for the purpose of  
including members of historically oppressed racial groups in the numerical minority of applying, 
selected, and enrolled students. The corollary would be the adoption of a facially race-conscious policy 
for a racially exclusionary purpose—to perpetuate animus toward or negative racial stereotypes about 
a racial group or solely to bring harm to members of a particular racial group. 
   17. For the discriminatory purpose requirement, see Davis, 426 U.S. 288. For the 
discriminatory effect requirement, see Davis as well as Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). See also 
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 18. The Court’s willingness to treat any and all race consciousness as capable of resulting in 
reverse discrimination against whites is a framing that has undoubtedly contributed to the current  
political climate in which many whites sincerely believe whites suffer greater levels of racial  
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I. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE THAT UT’S RACE-CONSCIOUS HOLISTIC REVIEW 
 DISCRIMINATED AGAINST AFRICAN AMERICANS AND LATINOS 
The Fall 2008 UT admissions policy challenged by petitioner Abigail Fisher 
had two components, one that Fisher challenged as violating the Equal Protection 
Clause and another that she argued constituted a race-neutral19 alternative to the 
first.20 The latter component of UT admissions was an example of admissions  
policies that have come to be known as “percentage plans.”21 These admissions 
policies guarantee college admission to a particular university or university system 
based on either a high school student’s grade point average (GPA)-based class  
ranking of all students attending a particular high school or a student’s placement 
within a designated percentage of a GPA-ranking of all high school students in his 
or her state—high school class rank or statewide GPA rank.22 
The Texas state legislature adopted the high school class rank type of  
percentage plan when in adopted the Texas Ten Percent Law.23 The state legislature 
 
discrimination than nonwhites. See, e.g., Samuel Sommers & Michael Norton, White People Think  
Racism is Getting Worse. Against White People, THE WASH. POST ( July 21, 2016), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/07/21/white-people-think-racism-is-getting-
worse-against-white-people/ [https://perma.cc/Q6RB-AK5S]; John Blake, Are Whites  
Racially Oppressed?, CNN (Mar. 4, 2011, 9:01 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/12/21/
white.persecution/index.html [https://perma.cc/C3NZ-SKGH]. 
19. Petitioner Fisher characterized UT’s Ten Percent Plan as not considering race despite the 
fact that the Texas state legislature was acutely aware that requiring UT to admit based on high school 
class rank would increase African American and Latino admissions due to the high levels of racial  
segregation in Texas public high schools. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and 
Other Relief at 11, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 1:08-cv-00263-SS) [hereinafter Second Amended 
Complaint] (“Neither race nor ethnic origin was considered in admissions to UT’s incoming freshman 
class under the Top 10-AI/PAI Plan used for admissions from 1998 through 2004.”). 
 20. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205. 
   21. In this important sense—the fact that the Texas Ten Percent Law guarantees top ranked 
high school students’ admission to the state’s most selective university—the Texas law differs from 
other state university admissions “percentage plans.” Significantly, the admissions percentage plans of 
states like California and Florida do not guarantee admission to those states’ university systems’ most 
selective and prestigious undergraduate universities. Instead, students ranking at the top of their high 
school classes in those states are guaranteed admission to one of the campuses in the university system 
but not guaranteed admission to their state’s flagship campuses. See CATHERINE L. HORN & STELLA 
M. FLORES, PERCENT PLANS IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE 
STATES’ EXPERIENCES 19–22 (2003) (describing differences between Texas percentage plan and  
California and Florida percentage plans that guarantee only admission to the University of California 
system, not admission to its most selective campuses, to the top 4% of each California’s high schools’ 
graduates and only admission to the Florida State University system, again not to its most selective 
campuses, to the top 20% of each Florida high school class). Again, in contrast, Texas top 10% students 
are guaranteed admission to UT Austin—the most selective university in the Texas system. 
22. Id. 
23. Under this law, HB 588 (the “Texas Ten Percent Law”), admission to UT—the flagship 
campus in the University of Texas system—is guaranteed to Texas residents graduating with a class 
rank in the top 10% or better from a Texas high school and for Texas students ranking in the top 10% 
who attended a school outside the United States operated by the U.S. Department of Defense. See H.B. 
588, 1997 Leg., 75th Reg. Sess. § 51.803 (Tex. 1997) [hereinafter Texas Ten Percent Law]. The Texas 
legislature passed the Ten Percent Law to remedy the effect of the Texas Attorney General’s ruling that 
UT was prohibited from considering race as a factor in admissions after the Fifth Circuit ruling in 
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enacted the plan in 1997 subsequent to the Texas Attorney General’s interpretation 
of a Fifth Circuit decision as requiring UT to eliminate any race-conscious 
components of its admissions process.24 Several years later, in 2003, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed in Grutter v. Bollinger that universities may legally consider race as 
a non-determinative factor in selective higher education admissions. After the 
Grutter ruling, UT reinstated a minimal degree of race consciousness to the then-
race-blind holistic review component of its admissions process. It is that aspect of 
UT admissions that the Court upheld as constitutional in Fisher II. 
Reverse discrimination petitioner Abigail Fisher was ineligible for admission 
to UT under the high school class rank percentage plan—Texas Ten Percent 
Plan25—because she ranked 81 out of 680 students at her high school.26 Fisher’s 
high school GPA ranking placed her in the top 12% of her graduating class, but not 
the top 10%. So, as the Court observed in Fisher II, Fisher had no chance of  
admission under UT’s race-blind top 10% admissions policy. Because the Ten  
Percent Plan made Fisher “categorically ineligible for more than three-fourths of 
the slots in the incoming freshman class,”27 she “would have had a better chance of 
being admitted to the University [of Texas] if the school used race-conscious holistic 
review to select its entire incoming class.”28 Nevertheless, Fisher claimed that UT’s 
race-conscious holistic review discriminated against her because she was white. The 
fact that UT’s race-conscious holistic review resulted in a significant white 
admissions advantage, not disadvantage, went unmentioned by the parties and the 
Court’s decision in Fisher II. 
 
Hopwood v. Texas. In her dissenting opinion in Fisher I, Justice Ginsburg offered a pointed and valid 
critique of the characterization of the Texas Ten Percent Law as “race neutral.” As Justice Ginsburg 
and scholars like Michelle Adams have observed that it may be incorrect to view the law as race neutral 
given that the racially inclusive effect of the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan is the result of exceedingly 
high degrees of racial segregation in Texas public high schools. See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting); Michelle Adams, Isn’t it Ironic? The Central Paradox at the Heart of “Percentage Plans,” 
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1767 (2001) (explaining that percentage plans function effectively to diversify 
higher education only if secondary education remains firmly racially segregated). 
  24. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); Effect of Hopwood v. Texas  
on Various Scholarship Programs of the University of Houston, 97 Op. Att’y Gen. 001 (1997),  
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/48morales/lo/1997/pdf/lo1997001.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4PEZ-UWAB]. 
 25. See Texas Ten Percent Law, supra note 23 and accompanying text; Adams, supra note 23; 
HORN & FLORES, supra note 21, at 19–22. 
 26. Fisher’s complaint alleges she ranked 82 out of 674 students who attended her high school. 
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 3. UT’s answer states she was ranked 81 out of 680 
students in her class. Answer of Defendants to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint at 3, Fisher  
v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 08-cv-00263). 
 27. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2209. 
 28. Id. at 8 (observing that “it seems quite plausible” that Abigail Fisher “would have had a 
better chance of being admitted to the University if the school used race-conscious holistic review to 
select its entire incoming class”). 
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A. Racial Outcomes Under UT Percentage Plan and Race-Conscious 
Holistic Admissions Compared 
Many facts about UT’s Fall 2008 admissions outcomes support the conclusion 
that the race-consciousness component of holistic review was not the cause of 
Fisher’s rejection. First, no African American or Latino applicant with lower 
admissions scores than Fisher was selected for Fall 2008 admission.29 Second, forty-
two white applicants with scores “identical to or lower than” Fisher were admitted.30 
The fact that higher-scoring nonwhites were rejected along with Fisher belies the 
notion that race was the determinative factor in her rejection. Likewise, the fact that 
other white applicants—some white applicants with identical scores and others with 
lower scores than Fisher—were admitted, strongly suggests Fisher was rejected for 
the simple reason that admissions officers were more impressed by other white and 
nonwhite candidates, not because Fisher was harmed by diversity-motivated race 
consciousness. Third, 168 African American and Latino students with credentials 
“identical to or higher than” Abigail Fisher were denied admission,31 showing that 
UT’s consideration of race was of such a small degree that significant numbers of 
well-qualified African American and Latino applicants were, like Fisher, rejected. 
  Despite these realities, the complaint filed by Fisher invoked the familiar 
reverse discrimination allegation that UT’s use of race operated as a “racial  
preference” that had “a pervasive negative effect on non-minority applicants.”32 
Fisher also relied on the average-test-score-of-admitted-students fallacy33—the  
erroneous conclusion that the existence of differences in the group average SAT 
scores of either all admitted African American or all admitted Latino students and 
the group average SAT score of all admitted white students proves the university in 
 
 29. See Brief for Respondents at 15–16, 16 n.6, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 [hereinafter Brief for 
Respondents]. 
 30. See id. at 16 n.6 (UT Austin responding to petitioner Fisher’s assertion that her “academic 
credentials exceeded those of many admitted minority applicants” and correcting the district court’s 
incorrect statement that sixty-four minority applicants with lower Academic Index (AI) scores than 
petitioner were admitted to the Liberal Arts major). 
 31. Id. at 16 n.6. Only one African American and four Latino students with lower scores than 
Fisher were offered admission. Id. at 15–16. 
   32. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 22. Though Fisher alleged “on information 
and belief” in the Second Amended Complaint that “but for” being white she would have been  
admitted to UT Austin. See id. at 25. Apparently, the evidence produced in discovery did not support 
this contention. Fisher’s lawyers made no such allegations in their briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court and 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, adding to the litany of reasons the Fisher case should have been  
dismissed. For other reasons, see Adam D. Chandler, How (Not) To Bring an Affirmative-Action  
Challenge, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 85 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/10/01/chandler.html.  
However, atypical for “reverse discrimination” plaintiffs, Fisher’s Supreme Court brief touted the fact 
that “many” of the accepted African American and Latino who enrolled at UT Austin would have been 
admitted “without regard to their race.” Brief for Petitioner at 9, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 [hereinafter 
Brief of Petitioner]. Fisher’s brief also noted that “some [minority enrollees] were admitted based solely 
on high AI [academic index] scores” and that “[m]any more” would have been admitted under the non-
automatic admissions process without their race being considered at all. Id. 
   33. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 17. See West-Faulcon, supra note 11, at 601. 
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question applied its test score standard in a racially discriminatory manner.34 There 
is no factual support for either of these conclusions.35 
Figure 1 shows the overall number of applicants by race and for international 
students admitted, combining the class rank-based portion of UT admissions and 
the race-conscious holistic review admissions component.36 
 
Figure 1. 37 
 
Figure 1 also shows that the total number of white applicants (including top 
10% and non-top 10%) to UT Austin was 14,03838 and that, of those white  
applicants, 6582 were admitted.39 Of the 2234 African American applicants, 728 
were admitted.40 For Latinos, the overall number of applicants was 6081 and, of 
those, 2621 Latino students were admitted.41 Of the 4344 Asian Americans who 
 
 34. See West-Faulcon, supra note 11. 
 35. See id. at 601–06. 
 36. UT Austin’s report on the 2008 UT admissions does not include data on the racial  
composition of the international student applicants and admits. See generally THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT 
AUSTIN OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS, IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF THE TEXAS AUTOMATIC 
ADMISSIONS LAW (HB 588) AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 6, 8 (2008) [hereinafter UT 
FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT]. 
   37. The data presented in Figure 1 is based upon my analysis of publicly available UT Austin 
admissions data. See id. at 6, 8; see also West-Faulcon, supra note 6, at 347. 
 38. See supra Figure 1. 
 39. See supra Figure 1. 
 40. See supra Figure 1. 
 41. See supra Figure 1. 
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applied, an overall 2309 Asian Americans were admitted.42 Figure 1 also shows that 
white applicants were admitted in higher numbers overall than any other racial 
group—specifically, the admission of 6582 white students exceeded the number of 
Latino and Asian American students admitted by 4000 and exceeded the number of 
admitted African American students by close to 6000. 
Figure 2 below compares the number of students who applied and were  
selected under the Ten Percent Plan component of UT admissions and the race-
conscious holistic review component. In accordance with the legislatively-imposed 
requirements of the Texas Ten Percent Law,43 UT’s race-blind Ten Percent Plan 
had the exact same results for all racial groups—all top 10% high school students 
were selected. But, whites fared better than nonwhites under the race-conscious 
holistic review selection process that Abigail Fisher challenged in the Fisher  
litigation. 
 
Figure 2.44 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows that the 4440 white students ranked in the top 10% were  
automatically admitted, as were 582 top 10% African American applicants.45 There 
were 2218 top 10% Latino applicants admitted along with the 1744 Asian American 
 
 42. Of the 2620 international students who applied, 536 international students were admitted. 
See supra Figure 1. 
 43. See Texas Top Ten Percent Law, supra note 23. 
 44. The data presented in Figure 2 is based upon my analysis of publicly available UT Austin 
admissions data. See UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36; West-Faulcon, supra note 11, at 
612, Figure 1. 
 45. See supra Figure 2. 
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top 10% automatic admits.46 Under the race-conscious holistic review component 
of UT admissions, Figure 2 shows that whites made up the overwhelming majority 
of students selected: 2142 of the 9598 white non-top 10% applicants were 
admitted.47 But far fewer non-top 10% nonwhites were selected—565 of 2600 
Asian Americans; 403 of 3863 Latinos; and only 146 of 1652 African Americans.48 
The total number of non-top 10% accepted white students (2142) not only far 
outnumbered the total number of accepted African Americans (146), Latinos (403), 
and Asian Americans (565), individually, the 2142 total number of non-top 10% 
whites admitted was almost twice the number of non-top 10% students from all 
other racial groups combined (1114).49 
B. Selection Rates for Ten Percent Plan and Race-Conscious Holistic Review by Race 
Because top 10% applicants from all racial groups were selected at a rate of 
100% based on their high school class rank,50 there was no racial disparity in  
selection rates under the Ten Percent Plan component of UT admissions.51  
However, Figure 3 shows UT’s race-conscious holistic review process had a much 
lower overall selection rate—17.7%52—and, significantly, the holistic review 
selection rate varied by race, with white applicants selection at the highest rate of all 
other racial groups under the race-conscious policy.53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46. See supra Figure 2. All 234 of the Top 10% international student applicants were also  
accepted for admission. See supra Figure 2. 
47. See supra Figure 2. 
48. See supra Figure 2. 
49. See supra Figure 2. The sum of the 146 African-American non-top 10% admits, 403 Latino 
non-top 10% admits, and 565 Asian American non-top 10% admits is 1114, which is a little over half 
of the 2142 total number of white non-top 10% admits. See supra Figure 2. 
   50. Over three-fourths of the Fall 2008 UT admission slots were awarded under the Ten  
Percent Plan. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2209. Only class rank or high Academic Index (AI) score were 
considered for about 83% of all the Fall 2008 UT admits, making the UT admissions process completely 
race-blind for 9359 out of 10,200 available spaces. Defendant’s Statement of Facts at 5, Fisher, 645 F. 
Supp. 2d at 587 (explaining that the vast majority of Texas residents were admitted without any 
consideration of the PAI (Personal Achievement Index) such that “for the class entering fall 2008, only 
841 available spaces in the freshman class remained available for Texas residents (out of 10,200) 
available spaces) after all automatic admissions based on” either class rank or a high predicted freshman-
year GPA were admitted). 
51. See supra Figure 2. All Top 10% applicants of all races were accepted. Therefore, the 10% 
admission rate for all races was 100%. See UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36, at 8. 
52. See infra Figure 3. 
53. Id. 
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Figure 3.54 
 
 
 
The selection rate for white applicants under UT’s race-conscious, holistic 
review was 22.3%.55 That was somewhat higher than the selection rate of 21.7% for 
holistic review Asian American applicants.56 The 22.3% white selection rate was 
much higher than—over twice as high as—the 10.4% selection rate for Latino 
applicants and two-and-a-half times greater than the 8.8% selection rate of African 
American applicants.57 Thus, Abigail Fisher’s admissions chances, as a white holistic 
review applicant, were over twice as high as they would have been for an African 
American or Latino applicant.58 
UT’s race-conscious holistic review also favored Abigail Fisher in another  
respect beyond the higher white selection rate—Figure 4 below shows Fisher had a 
better shot at holistic review admission than nonwhites because the proportion of 
white applicants accepted through UT’s holistic review process was greater than the 
 
 54. The data presented in Figure 3 is based upon my analysis of publicly available UT Austin 
admissions data. See UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36, at 6, 8; West-Faulcon, supra 
note 11, at 614, Figure 2. 
55. See supra Figure 3. 
  56. See supra Figure 3. The white non-top 10% admissions rate was also almost 10 percentage 
points higher than the admissions rate for international non-top 10% applicants. See supra Figure 3. 
57. See supra Figure 3. The 12.7% admission rate for non-top 10% international students was 
higher than the 8.8% African American admission rate and the 10.4% Latino admission rate. See supra 
Figure 3. 
 58. Scholars like Goodwin Liu have long concluded that racial affirmative action is highly  
unlikely to cause the rejection of an individual white applicant like Abigail Fisher. See generally, e.g., 
Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 1045 (2002). 
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proportion of nonwhites accepted holistically.59 Of the white students admitted to 
UT when Abigail Fisher applied, a greater percentage were admitted under the race-
conscious holistic review component of the UT admissions process than the 
percentage of nonwhites selected under holistic review. 
 
Figure 4.60 
 
 
 
Thus, the percentage of students from each racial group admitted under race-
conscious holistic review in Figure 4 reveals yet another white advantage. Whereas 
one out of three (32.5%) of white applicants were admitted to holistic review slots, 
only about one out of four (24.5%) of Asian American students, one out of five 
(20.0%) Latino students, and less than one out of six (15.4%) African Americans 
were selected under the race-conscious component of UT admissions.61 Within 
 
   59. The fact that white students had a numerical advantage in UT’s race-conscious process is 
consistent with Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that Abigail Fisher would have had a better chance of 
admission if UT had used its race-conscious holistic review to evaluate all Fall 2008 applicants. Fisher 
II, 136 S. Ct. at 2202 (explaining that Abigail Fisher applied for admission to UT’s 2008 freshman class 
but “was not in the top 10 percent of her high school graduating class, so she was evaluated for 
admission through holistic, full-file review” and was rejected). 
   60. The data presented in Figure 4 is based upon my analysis of publicly available UT Austin 
admissions data. See UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36, at 6, 8. 
 61. See supra Figure 4. Far from being a racial affirmative action policy that operated as a “set-
aside” for African American and Latino applicants, it could be argued that the holistic non-top 10% 
component of UT Austin’s admission policy had the practical result of “setting-aside” more non-top 
10% admission slots for whites than it did for nonwhites. Close to one-third of all the white applicants 
admitted to UT Austin when Abigail Fisher applied were non-top 10% applicants whereas only one-
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racial groups, admitted white students were more likely to have been admitted under 
UT’s race-conscious holistic review process than nonwhites. Alternatively, African 
American, Latino, and Asian American students were more likely than whites to 
have been selected solely based on class. 
Figures 1–4 show that Fisher’s white racial group membership was an  
advantage under UT’s race-conscious non-top 10% holistic review, not a hindrance. 
Contrary to Justice Alito’s proclamation in his Fisher II dissent that UT’s policy 
constituted affirmative action “gone wild,”62 the policy admitted substantially more 
white students, numerically and by percentage, than African American, Latino, and 
Asian American students.63 Far from constituting a racial classification that reduced 
the admissions chances of whites, UT’s race-conscious holistic review resulted in 
admission rate disparities sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Title VI 
disparate impact law.64 
C. The Racial Disparity Fisher II Should Have Considered 
 By applying strict scrutiny, Justice Kennedy adopts the framing that UT’s  
holistic review was racial affirmative action that presumptively violated the equal 
 
fifth or less of the African American and Latino students admitted were not ranked in the top 10% of 
their high school graduating class. 
   62. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2232 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing UT’s holistic review  
admissions policy as affirmative action “gone wild”). 
 63. See supra Figures 1, 2, and 3. It also admitted substantially more white students than Asian 
American students numerically, although not by percentage. Id. 
   64. In 2001, in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001), Justice Scalia issued a ruling 
on behalf of the Court that no private right of action exists to enforce Title VI disparate impact 
regulations. In a dissent to the majority opinion in Sandoval, Justice Stevens suggested that rejected 
applicants could bring Title VI effect discrimination cases under the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights statute 
even though the Sandoval decision had eliminated plaintiffs’ direct cause of action to sue for Title VI 
disparate impact discrimination. Id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Litigants who in the future wish to 
enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only reference § 1983 to obtain 
relief . . . .”). Whether a rejected applicant can privately sue a university under § 1983 for violating Title 
VI disparate impact regulations has been rejected in some circuits but remains a possibility in others. 
Specifically, the rule established by the Court in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe presents a considerable hurdle 
to plaintiffs seeking to enforce disparate impact regulations using § 1983. See 536 U.S. 273, 287–88 
(2002) (discussing only individual entitlements as being enforceable under § 1983). In fact, a number of 
circuits have rejected Justice Stevens’s approach. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Detroit, 446 F.3d 614, 629 
(6th Cir. 2006) (overruling Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 1994), and relying on 
a combined reading of the Court’s decisions in Gonzaga and Sandoval to hold that a federal regulation 
such as the U.S. Housing Act cannot independently create an enforceable § 1983 right); Save Our Valley 
v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that disparate impact regulations are 
unenforceable under § 1983); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 
774 (3d Cir. 2001) (same); Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1010–11 (11th Cir. 1997) (same). However, 
even if private enforcement of Title VI regulations is precluded by the Court’s ruling in Sandoval, 
students rejected for admission may still file complaints with the U.S. Department of Education Office 
of Civil Rights (OCR) alleging that the admissions policies of the university that rejected them had a 
Title VI discriminatory effect on the basis of race. 
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protection rights of white applicants.65 Kennedy applies strict scrutiny despite the 
fact that UT’s race-conscious admissions policy did not negatively impact plaintiff 
Abigail Fisher’s chances of admission to UT because she was white and despite the 
fact that the holistic review process did not have any proven negative impact on 
whites as a racial group. Figures 1–4 also show that the admissions outcomes under 
UT’s race-conscious holistic review process bear no resemblance to the racial 
breakdown of admissions rates to be expected under a robust and effective racial 
affirmative action policy—a minimum of equal and, more likely, even higher 
selection rates for the racial groups being targeted for inclusion by the affirmative 
action policy. UT’s race-conscious holistic review had the exact opposite statistical 
outcome. 
UT admitted white holistic review applicants at not just a higher rate, but a 
statistically significant higher rate, than similarly situated African Americans and 
Latinos.66 Table 1 below shows UT’s race-conscious holistic review had a negative 
impact on African American and Latino admission rates, not a positive one. The 
table sets forth my original Title VI disparate impact analysis of the racial disparities 
in Fall 2008 UT non-top 10% holistic review admissions.67 It reveals a magnitude 
 
 65. Kennedy does this when he treats the policy’s race consciousness at a racial classification 
warranting strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (5th 
ed. 2015) (explaining presumptions embedded in application of strict scrutiny standard of review). 
 66. Justice Alito is incorrect in his Fisher II dissent when he asserts repeatedly that UT’s  
admissions policy racially discriminated against Asian Americans. The fall 2008 outcomes do not bear 
that out. As I examine in detail in Obscuring Asian Penalty with Illusions of Black Bonus, Asian American 
applicants were admitted at rates similar to white applicants under both the percentage plan and race-
conscious holistic review admissions processes. See West-Faulcon, Obscuring Asian Penalty, supra note 
11; see also Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2207 (“the contention that the University discriminates against Asian-
Americans is ‘entirely unsupported by evidence in the record or empirical data’”) (citing Brief of Asian 
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund et al. as Amicus Curiae 12). 
 67.  U.S. Department of Education regulations promulgated to enforce Title VI have been 
interpreted to require federally funded universities to justify large racial disparities in admission rates. 
See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (“No person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”). Title VI disparate impact regulations prohibit federally funded universities from 
using selection criteria in a manner that constitutes effect discrimination. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(vii)(2) 
(2008) (stating that a recipient of federal funds may not “utilize criteria or methods of administration 
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national 
origin”). Id. A violation of Title VI regulations does not require proof of purposeful discrimination. See 
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293–95, 295 n.11 (1985) (explaining Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)). In Guardians, a majority of the Court held that liability under Title VI 
itself is identical to the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause in its requirement that 
plaintiffs prove discriminatory purpose, while a different majority held that proof of discriminatory 
effect suffices when the suit is brought to enforce regulations issued pursuant to Title VI. See Guardians, 
463 U.S. at 608 n.1 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (detailing the multiple holdings of the Court). In 
Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court assumed that proof of discriminatory impact was sufficient to 
demonstrate a violation of the Title VI regulations. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281–82 
(“[R]egulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI may validly proscribe activities that have a 
disparate impact on racial groups . . . .”); see also Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending 
Health Care Discrimination—It Shouldn’t Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 949 (1990) (“The 
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of racially statistical disparity large enough to establish a prima facie violation of 
Title VI disparate impact law and requiring justification if the university in question 
receives federal funds. 
 
Table 1. 
 
Racially Disparate Impact Analysis of Fall 2008 UT Holistic Review68 
 
Non-Top 10% 
Applicants 
 
 
% Admitted 
(selection 
rate) 
 
4/5th Rule Violated 
(< 80% or 0.80) 
 
Chi Square 
p value<0.01 is 
significant 
 
African  
American 
 
White 
    8.8% 
 
22.3% 
8.8/22.3 = 0.40 
Yes, African  
Americans selected 
at less than 80% 
(40%) of white 
selection rate 
158.06 
p<0.00 
 (disparity in rates 
is significant) 
 
 
Latino 
 
White 
10.4% 
 
22.3% 
10.4/22.3 = .47 
Yes, Latinos selected 
at less than 80% 
(47%) of white       
selection rate 
253.76 
p<0.00 
 (disparity in rates 
is significant) 
 
 
Asian  
American 
 
White 
 
   
   21.7% 
 
22.3% 
21.7/22.3 = .97 
No, Asian Americans 
selected at 97%        
(not less than 80%) of 
white  
selection rate 
0.41 
p=0.52 
 (disparity in rates 
is NOT  
significant) 
 
 
Table 1 applies the “four-fifths (80%) rule”69 and the Pearson chi-square70 
statistical test and finds a significant racially discriminatory effect against African 
 
issue of whether Title VI and its implementing regulations proscribe unintentional discrimination with 
a disproportionate adverse impact has had a tortured history in the Supreme Court.”). 
   68. See West-Faulcon, Forsaking Claims of Merit, supra note 6, at 353. 
 69. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2015) (explaining the “four-fifths rule” for adverse impact). 
 70. The more sophisticated chi square statistical test assesses the likelihood that the racial  
disparity in the admission rate outcomes of UT’s fall 2008 admissions cycle—the fact that whites were 
admitted at twice the rate as Blacks and Latinos—was a random or chance event. Chi-square analysis 
tests the likelihood that the racial disparities in UT admission rates are a product of random chance 
versus potential evidence of racial discrimination. The chi-square analysis in Table 1 rejects the  
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Americans and Latinos within the meaning of Title VI disparate impact law.71 It 
does not reveal a statistically significant difference between the Asian American  
admission rate and the white admission rate.72 
The “% Admitted” column in Table 1 compares the African American,  
Latino, and Asian American selection rates to the selection rate for white race- 
conscious holistic review applicants. The “4/5th Rule Violated” column is my  
calculation of the ratio of the African American, Latino, and Asian American  
selection rates and the higher white selection rate. The “Chi Square” column shows 
the chi square value and whether the corresponding p value is less than 0.01. A p 
value less than 0.01 means the racial disparity between the nonwhite admission rate 
and the white admission rate did not happen by chance. 
Under the 80% rule, the selection rate ratio comparing the selection rate for 
non-top 10% African American applicants to the white selection rate is 40% (8.8% 
divided by 22.3%)—far less than 80%; the Latino-white selection rate ratio is only 
47% (10.4% divided by 22.3%)—also far less than 80%. By contrast, the ratio 
comparing the white-Asian American holistic review selection rate is 97% (21.7% 
divided by 22.3%)—significantly higher than 80%.73 The chi square analysis results 
of 158.06 and 253.76 for the comparisons of the white selection rate to the African 
American and Latino selection rates, respectively, result in p values much lower than 
0.01 in both instances and thus are statistically significant. By contrast, the p value 
of 0.52 associated with the chi square of 0.41 for the small difference between the 
Asian American selection rate and the white selection rate is greater than 0.01 and 
therefore not statistically significant. The analysis in Table 1 shows that the 
disparities between the African American and Latino holistic review selection rates 
and the white holistic review selection rate are of such a magnitude that an African 
American or Latino student denied admission along with Abigail Fisher could 
establish sufficient adverse impact to allege UT’s race-conscious holistic review 
violated their civil rights under Title VI disparate impact law. 
Table 1’s analysis also confirms what is intuitive. Selecting African American 
or Latino applicants at half of the rate of white applicants constitutes a degree of 
 
hypothesis that the disparities between the lower African American and Latino admission rates are the 
result of random chance. See supra Table 1. 
 71. The Court has treated the 80% test as a “rule of thumb” that permits plaintiffs to establish 
a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VI disparate impact law when a racial group is admitted 
at less than 8% of the admit rate of the racial group with the highest selection rate. See Castaneda v. 
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977) (observing that when expected results and actual results differ 
by more than two or three standard deviations, the statistical disparity in selection rates  
constitutes evidence of a Title VI disparate impact). Courts have interpreted Title VI to require that the 
racial disparity exist not just within the overall applicant pool but also within the subpopulation of 
“qualified” applicants. In other words, there is proof of Title VI discriminatory effect if, considering 
only qualified applicants, the racial disparities are large enough to be statistically significant.  
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307–08 (1977) (“Where gross statistical  
disparities can be shown, they alone may . . . constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of  
discrimination.”). 
72. See West-Faulcon, Obscuring Asian Penalty, supra note 11. 
73. Id. 
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disparity of a magnitude that is exceedingly unlikely to be due to chance. Yet, in 
Fisher II, UT’s policy was subject to the doctrinal presumption that UT violated the 
equal protection rights of rejected white applicant Abigail Fisher—by the Court’s 
application of the strict scrutiny standard. The Court’s treatment of UT’s holistic 
review as a racial classification warranting strict scrutiny to protect Fisher from 
racial discrimination demonstrates how strongly equal protection doctrine favors 
reverse discrimination claims, even if whites suffer no disadvantage from a policy’s 
race consciousness. 
II. THE NON-CLASSIFYING RACE CONSCIOUSNESS OF UT’S HOLISTIC REVIEW 
Contrary to claims of Fisher and several amici that UT employed anti-white 
and anti-Asian American racial preferences,74 Part I demonstrated quantitatively 
that UT’s holistic review was racially preferential to whites, not African Americans 
and Latinos—admitting the former at twice the rate of the latter two groups. This 
Part takes a qualitative look at the Fall 2008 UT admissions process to further  
illuminate the inappropriateness of the Court’s categorization of UT’s minimally 
race-conscious holistic review as a racial classification under equal protection  
analysis.75 Next, this Part asserts that the Court’s current reversed equal protection 
doctrine should be corrected to avoid the perverse doctrinal double standard  
exposed by Fisher II—an inappropriately low evidentiary burden on reverse  
discrimination plaintiffs to demonstrate the existence of a racial classification and 
an inappropriately high one for traditional discrimination plaintiffs. 
 Over the strong objection of dissenting justices,76 the Court treats all race-
based affirmative action policies as racial classifications without regard to the  
 
 74. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 22; Brief for Richard Sander and Stuart  
Taylor as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 9, at 3–5. 
 75. For the Court’s early articulation of the rationale for applying heightened scrutiny to racial 
classifications, see U.S. v. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The Court’s flawed application of strict 
scrutiny in Korematsu led the Court to hold that the race and national origin-based internment of all 
persons of Japanese descent was justified under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. In Fisher II, the Court 
treated UT’s holistic admissions policy as a racial classification but held that the UT policy considered 
race in a sufficiently restrained manner to satisfy the Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325, “narrowly tailored” 
requirement. Prior to 1996, UT’s law school considered race as an admissions criterion for the purpose 
of increasing the admission rate of African American and Latino applicants. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). In 1992, Cheryl Hopwood, a white applicant denied admission to the 
University of Texas School of Law, sued the law school contending its consideration of race to benefit 
nonwhite applicants violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 938. After the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the law school’s consideration of race constituted a “racial 
preference” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, UT completely eliminated race as an admissions 
criterion. In 1997, after UT eliminated all race consciousness from its admissions policy, the Texas 
Legislature passed HB 588, a law that defined admissions-related merit exclusively as having a high 
class rank. See id. at 962. 
   76. See, e.g., J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 535-536, 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
intermediate scrutiny should apply to “race-conscious classifications designed to further remedial 
goals,” and critiques the application of strict scrutiny because doing so renders the seemingly illogical 
conclusion “that remedial classifications warrant no different standard of review under the Constitution 
than the most brutal and repugnant forms of state-sponsored racism”). 
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magnitude of the policy’s race-consciousness and has not required the reverse  
discrimination claimant to prove the affirmative action policy in question  
unjustifiably reduced his or her admission chances on the basis of race.77 In so 
doing, the Court has transformed the Equal Protection Clause—a provision 
conferring full citizenship to all persons born in the U.S. and protecting them from 
government-driven racial subordination78—into a weapon for eradicating race-
conscious affirmative action on the theory that any consideration of race poses 
imminent danger of race discrimination against whites.79 As a result, the theory that 
a race-conscious effort to include nonwhites is, in and of itself, a form of race 
discrimination against whites has gained wider acceptance.80 The facts in Fisher offer 
a strong counter to the presumption that any degree of race-consciousness warrants 
the Court’s most stringent level of review. UT’s holistic review limited the degree 
to which admissions officers could consider race and also relied so heavily on non-
racial considerations that both should have prompted the Court to adopt a more 
nuanced doctrinal approach. 
A new impact requirement for reverse discrimination claims should require a 
showing of a particular degree of racially adverse impact on whites as a racial group 
in order for the Court to treat the race-conscious policy in questions as a racial 
classification triggering strict scrutiny.81 If the Court were to adopt such an  
evidentiary standard, it would be more consistent with Justice Kennedy’s  
acknowledgement in Fisher II that UT’s race-conscious holistic review offered more 
advantages to Abigail Fisher than the race-blind class rank-based top 10% policy. 
Details missing from Kennedy’s analysis in Fisher II could have driven this point 
even further. Factual details about the specific degree of race consciousness and the 
 
 77. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (highly selective nature of Univ. of Michigan’s undergraduate 
admissions policy made it difficult for students with Gratz’s credentials to gain admission);  
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (policy only required white contractors hire a relatively small percentage 
of nonwhite subcontractors and also permitted waivers for white contractors unable to do so); Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265 (age not race most likely reason for Allan Bakke’s rejection). 
   78. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303, 307-308 (1880)) (“The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they 
contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race—the 
right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored—exemption from 
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of 
the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the 
condition of a subject race.”). In Strauder v. West, the Court observed, “[t]he true spirit and meaning 
of the amendments . . . cannot be understood without keeping in view the history of the times when 
they were adopted and the general objects they plainly sought to accomplish.” 100 U.S. at 306. 
   79. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 525 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (expressing 
concern that racial affirmative action violates the Equal Protection Clause because it is operates to “act 
to the detriment” of whites based on their race). 
   80. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288–300 (explaining rationale for applying strict scrutiny to UC 
Davis medical school race-based affirmative action policy). 
 81. Robinson, supra note 10, at 172 (“[R]ace-conscious policies that seek to promote diversity 
or remedy past discrimination are the primary site of contemporary racial classification and Supreme 
Court scrutiny.”). Professor Robinson has observed that “when strict scrutiny appears in the Court’s 
race jurisprudence today, it is almost invariably on behalf of white litigants such as Abigail Fisher, who 
wield it to dismantle affirmative action policies.” Id. 
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overall context and manner in which a policy permits race to be considered are 
factors that should be used to limit strict scrutiny to policies that have harmed or 
have some realistic potential to harm whites. 
A. Missing Details of UT’s Holistic Review 
UT’s holistic review was substantially more limited in its race consciousness 
than Justice Kennedy’s Fisher II description suggests. While Kennedy set forth  
important details about how UT considered race to derive the only permissibly race-
conscious factor in UT’s holistic review—an applicant’s Personal Achievement 
Index (PAI) score, he omitted the key contextual detail that the PAI score had only 
a limited role in where an application landed on an admissions decision grid.82 
1. AI Score Columns, PAI Score Rows, and the Decision Line 
The Academic Index (AI) score was an SAT- and class rank-driven prediction 
of the future college freshman-year GPA of the applicant, ranging from 0.00 to 
4.10.83 To calculate AI score, admissions officers inputted high school class rank, 
high school class size, SAT verbal score, and SAT math score into one of four 
possible regression equations depending upon the applicant’s intended 
undergraduate major.84 For instance, the AI score of an applicant applying to UT’s 
undergraduate business major was generated using the following equation: 
Predicted Freshman GPA = -2.31253 + (SAT V * 0.00157) + (SAT M * 0.00229) 
+ (HSR * 0.03419). An additional tenth of a point could be added to the resulting 
 
   82. Cf. UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36, at 3 (explaining that academic index 
scores and personal achievement index scores “are then plotted on an admissions decision grid” and 
“[a]dmissions liaisons, and/or representatives of Deans’ offices or faculty, then make decisions as to 
which cells [of the admissions decision grid] to select as admitted students”). 
 83. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 596. 
 84. The four AI score equations used by UT in Fall 2008 were as follows. For Liberal Arts, 
Communications, Fine Arts, Social Work, and Education Majors: Predicted Freshman GPA =  
-0.19949 + (SAT V * 0.00142) + (SAT M * 0.00191) + (HSR * 0.01459). For Nursing, Natural Sciences, 
and Architecture Majors: Predicted Freshman GPA = -1.10339 + (SAT V * 0.00088166) + (SAT M * 
0.00230) + (HSR * 0.02416). For Engineering Majors: Predicted Freshman GPA =  
-1.53545 + (SAT V * 0.00072937) + (SAT M * 0.00313) + (HSR * 0.02285). For Business Majors: 
Predicted Freshman GPA = -2.31253 + (SAT V * 0.00157) + (SAT M * 0.00229) + (HSR * 0.03419). 
See UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36, at 5. A significant portion of selective universities 
use a regression equation combining applicant SAT scores with high school grade point averages (not 
necessarily class rank as done by UT) to create a numerical composite index score that predicts 
freshman-year college grades for the applicant, then proceed to use those predictions to compare and 
rank applicants quantitatively. Abigail Fisher may very well be an example of a candidate for whom a 
university’s overreliance on SAT scores unfairly undermined her selection because, as I have explained 
elsewhere, this by-the-numbers, formula-driven prediction of a high school applicant’s future grades in 
college is useful but imperfect. See Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps 
State Anti-Affirmative Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075, 1114–15 (2009) (“A major ostensible 
reason that colleges require applicants to take the SAT is that an applicant’s SAT score offers admissions 
officers information that assists them in predicting whether a student is likely to succeed at their 
institution. Educational-measurement experts produce institution-specific data about the future success 
of high-school students by comparing the entering SAT scores of prior applicants with their first-year 
grades during college.”). 
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number if the applicant “exceeded UT’s required high school curriculum.”85 The 
record in the Fisher litigation did not reveal the predictive power of UT’s AI score. 
Generally, such regression equation-based predictions of first-year college GPA 
explain less than one quarter of the variation in high school students’ early college 
grades.86 
UT used a different equation to generate an applicant’s PAI score. That 
equation was PAI = [(PAS *4)+(essay score average*3)]/7,87 requiring admissions 
officers to input the average of an applicant’s scores on two required essays and the 
applicant’s assigned Personal Achievement Score (PAS). The PAS was a score 
assigned by admissions officers based on evaluation of information the applicant 
submitted relevant to six non-academic personal achievement categories. Those six 
PAS categories were (1) leadership, (2) extracurricular activities, (3) awards/honors, 
(4) work experience, (5) service to school or community, and (6) special 
circumstances.88 Both the PAI score and the PAS ranged from 1.0 to 6.0. 
The last PAS category—“special circumstances”—permitted, but did not 
require, admissions readers to increase an applicant’s PAS based on an evaluation 
of some, all, or none of seven special circumstances factors. Those seven factors 
were (1) the socioeconomic status of the applicant’s family, (2) the socioeconomic 
status of the applicant’s school, (3) the applicant’s family responsibilities, (4) 
whether the applicant lives in a single-parent home, (5) the applicant’s SAT score 
in relation to the average SAT score of the applicant’s high school, (6) the language 
spoken at the applicant’s home, and (7) the applicant’s race.89 
 Kennedy’s Fisher II description of “admission officers from each school 
within the University set[ting] a cutoff PAI/AI score combination for  
admission, and then admit[ting] all of the applicants who are above the cutoff 
point”90 obfuscates how little potential there was for race to impact the ultimate 
grid-based UT admissions decision. Even though UT’s holistic review did involve 
an admissions officer conducting a “full-file review,”91 whether an application was 
 
 85. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 596. 
 86. The vast majority of variation among the grades of college freshman is explained by  
variables other than SAT score and class rank. 
   87. See Affidavit of Kedra B. Ishop at 2, Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (No. 1:08-CV-00263-
SS) [hereinafter Ishop Affidavit]. 
 88. Id. 
 89. The Fisher litigation was an equal protection challenge of UT’s inclusion of race as the last 
of seven non-mandatory, permissible special circumstances factors. 
 90. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207.  The Court elaborated on the fact that admissions officers did 
not consider race in any way in selecting the AI-PAI cutoff score. On this point, the Court noted that 
“[i]n setting the cutoff, those admissions officers only know how many applicants received a given 
PAI/AI score combination.” Id. (“The admissions officers who make the final decision as to whether 
a particular applicant will be admitted make that decision without knowing the applicant’s race.”). 
 91. Id. at 6. 
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to the left (accepted)92 or right (rejected)93 of a “decision line”94 determined 
admission. The decision line was drawn by admissions officers to choose enough 
applications to fill the small number of admissions slots in each major that were left 
after automatic Ten Percent Plan admissions.95 Figure 5 is an example of a UT 
admissions decision grid. 
 
Figure 5. 
 
 
The one-digit numbers on the grid in Figure 5 indicate the number of  
applications with the AI score and PAI score combination corresponding to  
particular AI column and PAI row coordinates on the grid.96 This means, for 
example, the number “1” in AI score column labeled “370” and the top PAI score 
row (not labeled) indicates one holistic review applicant was assigned an AI score 
of 370 and the highest PAI score of 6 (indicated by placement in the 6th highest 
row).97 Since admissions officers had only knowledge of the number of applicants 
within each grid cell98 and had no knowledge of the race or any other aspect of the 
 
   92. See UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36, at 3 (“The most-qualified candidates 
are located in the cells closest to the upper left corner.”); see also Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment at 17, Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 1:08-CV-00263-SS). 
   93. See UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, supra note 36, at 3 (describing how rejected  
applicants are either: (1) “cascaded” to their second-preferred major; (2) offered Summer Freshman 
Admission; or (3) offered CAP at another UT system school). 
   94. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 29, at 26. 
 95. Ishop Affidavit, supra note 88, at Ex. B. 
 96. Id. The grid columns are labeled with numbers corresponding with the range of AI scores, 
predicted freshman GPA, (0.0 to 4.10) multiplied by 100 across the top horizontally—the  
highest possible number was 410 and the lowest was 000 (although the grid stopped at <240). The grid 
rows from bottom to top correspond with the range of PAI scores (1 to 6)—the highest row  
corresponds to the highest PAI score. 
 97. Cells closer to the top left corner of the grid, those corresponding with a higher AI and 
higher PAI scores, were the most likely to be admitted, space permitting. See UT Freshmen Fall 2008 
Report, supra note 36, at 3. 
   98. See id. (“Admissions liaisons, and/or representatives of Deans’ offices or faculty, then make 
decisions as to which cells to select as admitted students.”). 
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identity of the individuals in the cells being selected for admission,99 the decisional 
stage of UT’s holistic review was not race conscious.100 
2. Heavy Weight and Impact of AI Score 
 Although Justice Kennedy was correct to observe that Fisher’s chances of  
admission to UT would have been improved if UT had used holistic review to admit 
a larger proportion of the class, Kennedy did not point out how minimally the 
discretionary consideration of race factored in UT’s holistic review or how much 
SAT score and class rank predominated which students were selected for holistic 
review admission. Holistic review factors such as student essays, leadership 
participation, sports involvement, community service, and letters of 
recommendation influenced an applicant’s selection or rejection under holistic 
review far less than SAT scores, GPA, and class rank. The great weight afforded the 
AI score—the completely race-blind, SAT score-driven component of holistic 
review—meant an applicant’s AI score influenced final positioning on the 
admissions decision grid much more than the personal-achievement-focused and 
potentially race-conscious PAI score, further demonstrating the minimal role race 
played in UT’s holistic review.101  
In addition, Kennedy’s Fisher II opinion neglected to explain how much more 
the AI score, as compared to the PAI score, impacted whether an application fell in 
an “accepted” position on the UT decision grid. As can be seen in Figure 5 above, 
it took a ten times greater difference in an applicant’s PAI score—one whole 
point—to move the applicant into a higher row on the grid.102 As a consequence, 
only a large difference in PAI score, which would be contingent on a very large 
difference in PAS, would be sufficient to impact the ultimate admissions decision 
for a particular applicant. In stark contrast, a very small difference in an applicant’s 
AI score—just one tenth of a point (since AI scores were multiplied by 100 before 
plotting on a grid)—could change the right-to-left column position of an 
application on the UT admissions decision grid. In other words, if an applicant’s 
race-blind AI score was low, having a high PAI score did not matter at all. 
 
   99. Again, admissions officers only knew how many applicants “landed” in that cell after their 
combination of the first-year college predicted GPA and personal achievement overall score had been 
plotted on the UT admissions grid. See id. 
 100. Justice Kennedy’s description of the holistic process in Fisher II failed to explain that the 
final stage of that process was based on the drawing of a decision line on the admissions grid for the 
majors to which Fisher applied and was thus a completely race-blind decision. 
 101.  Because Fisher was ineligible for Ten Percent Plan automatic admission and also ineligible 
for high AI score automatic admission, her only route to admission was through UT’s holistic review 
process. 
 102.  The highest PAI score of 6.0 would locate an application in the top row on the admissions 
decision grid whereas a PAI score of 1.0 would place an application in the lowest row of the grid. See 
Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 20, Fisher, 645 F. 
Supp. 2d at 587 (No. 1:08-CV-00263-SS) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts]. (“One-tenth of 
an AI [academic index score] point or one PAI [personal achievement index score] point can be 
determinative as to whether an applicant is admitted or not admitted.”). 
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Abigail Fisher’s rejection by UT bears this out. It was Fisher’s AI score, not 
her potentially race-conscious PAI score, that resulted in her rejection. With an AI 
score of 3.1, Fisher’s application would have been located in the AI column labeled 
“310.” Because so many applicants with significantly higher SAT scores had applied 
to both the Liberal Arts and Business school majors, Fisher’s application location 
would have been too far right on the admissions grid to be on the left side of the 
decision line, irrespective of whether it was located in the highest PAI row of six. 
As explained by UT, Fisher “would not have been admitted to the Fall 2008 
freshman class even if she had received ‘a “perfect” PAI score of 6.’”103 Thus, not 
only was there a mathematical limit on how much the minimally race-conscious PAS 
could impact the PAI score—the PAI score (itself, even less determined by race 
than PAS) counted for only four-sevenths of an applicant’s PAS and not more,104 
there was a mathematical limit on how much the PAI score could impact the 
location of an application on the decision grid. 
Other details of UT’s admissions policy also demonstrate how significantly an 
applicant’s race-blind, SAT-driven AI score impacted admission. AI score alone 
determined the admission of some applicants. If they had a sufficiently high AI 
score, applicants were called “‘A’ group applicants” and were automatically admitted 
while applicants whose AI scores were deemed too low were referred to as “‘C’ 
group applicants” and were deemed “presumptively inadmissible.”105 For Fall 2008 
admissions, applicants with an AI score of 2.599 or lower were designated “C” 
group applicants and, thus, considered presumptively ineligible for admission.106 
Those applicants fitting in neither the “A” nor “C” groups—presumably “B” group 
applicants—were eligible to be considered under holistic review. Despite it further 
demonstrating the exceedingly minimal role that race played in UT admissions, the 
fact that holistic review was actually conducted for only a subset of holistic review 
applicants—such B group applicants—was not mentioned in the Fisher II majority 
opinion. 
 The Court’s Fisher II decision likewise made no mention of, nor did UT  
emphasize, the fact that five of UT’s undergraduate majors “admitted applicants 
automatically on a rolling basis if their AI score exceeded a particular threshold (so-
 
   103. Brief for Respondents, supra note 29, at 15 (“The summary judgment record is  
uncontradicted that—due to the stiff competition in 2008 and petitioner’s relatively low AI score—
petitioner would not have been admitted to the Fall 2008 freshman class even if she had received ‘a 
“perfect” PAI score of 6.’”). This suggests that Abigail Fisher did not have particularly high written 
essay scores or her AI score was so low that it situated her on the wrong side of the applicable decision 
line on the admissions decision grid for the UT majors to which Fisher applied. Even an applicant with 
a perfect personal achievement sub-score of 6.0 would not have a high personal achievement overall 
score if that applicant’s two written essay scores were middling on the scale of one to six points. 
 104. Because PAI = [(PAS * 4)+(essay score average * 3)]/7, PAS was four-sevenths of PAS 
and the average of the applicant’s two essay scores was three-sevenths. See Ishop Affidavit, supra note 
88. 
 105. Defendants’ Statement of Facts at 16, Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (No. 1:08-CV-00263-
SS). 
 106. Id. 
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called “A” group applicants).”107 UT never disclosed the number of such 
automatically admitted students for Fall 2008—the number of applicants admitted 
based solely on “high AI” score.108 What is known is that applicants to Natural 
Sciences were admitted automatically if they had an AI score of 3.5 or higher, to 
Geosciences with an AI score of 3.6 or higher, to Liberal Arts with an AI score of 
3.9 or higher, to Social Work with an AI score of 3.6 or higher, to Education in 
Applied Learning & Development with an AI score of 3.6 or higher, and to 
Education in Special Education with an AI score of 3.4 or higher.109 
The major role that the SAT score-driven AI score had on admission is clear 
from how it impacted Abigail Fisher’s application to UT. Fisher’s SAT score was 
1180 (out of 1600),110 whereas the average SAT score of all Fall 2008 non-top 10% 
applicants who went on to enroll at UT was 1285.111 Fisher’s less than stellar SAT 
score resulted in a less than stellar AI score—a predicted freshman-year GPA of 
3.1.112 Since Fisher applied to UT to major in either Liberal Arts or Business, she 
was compared to a particularly high AI score cohort. 
The School of Business, in particular, was so popular among UT applicants 
that the number of Top Ten Percent Plan admissions was capped at “75% of the 
program’s available admission slots” such that only a small portion of even the top 
10% applicants who wished to major in Business could be admitted. As a result, 
only those applicants who “graduated within approximately the top 4% of their high 
school class and selected a business major as their first choice”113 were actually 
admitted to UT’s Business major through the top 10% automatic process. The 
 
 107. Id. (“After all admissions offers based solely on academic performance (either pursuant to 
the Top ten percent rule or due to the applicant’s high AI) were made for the Fall 2008 entering  
freshmen class, only 841 available admissions slots (out of a possible 10,200) remained open for Texas 
residents.”). 
 108. Id. at 14. 
 109. Id. 
  110. Fisher’s score on the verbal/reading section of the SAT was 500, and her score on the 
math section was 680. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 22. The year before Fisher applied, 
only 33.3% of the students admitted for non-top 10% fall admission had SAT scores as low as or  
lower than Fisher’s 1180. See THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS,  
THE PERFORMANCE OF STUDENTS ATTENDING THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN AS A 
RESULT OF THE COORDINATE ADMISSION PROGRAM (CAP) STUDENTS APPLYING AS FRESHMEN 
2007 REPORT 7, at 4 tbl.5 (Feb. 8, 2010) [hereinafter APPLYING AS FRESHMEN 2007], https://
s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.utexas.edu/ContentPages/55689852.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/35SB-QTJU]. The percentage was even lower for 2007 Summer Freshmen admissions—
only 29.3% had SAT scores of 1190 or lower. Id. 
   111. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 4; UT FRESHMEN FALL 2008 REPORT, 
supra note 36, at 9. 
   112. See Brief for Amici Curiae National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
Texas State Conference of NAACP Branches and Barbara Bader in Support of Respondents at 6, 
Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (No. 1:08-CV-00263-SS) (explaining that Fisher’s AI score of 3.1 was 
too low to qualify for “A” group admission). The Texas State NAACP amicus brief also noted: “Race 
played no part whatsoever in the calculation of the AI. ‘A’ group applicants had high AIs, and were 
offered admission to UT automatically on a rolling basis. JA 434a. Petitioner was not an ‘A’ group 
applicant, thus, she again failed to qualify for automatic admission.” Id. 
 113. Id. at 15. 
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“remaining 25% of the slots” to the School of Business were filled using holistic 
review. Non-top 10% applicants like Abigail Fisher seeking to be Business majors 
had to compete against the remaining top 10% applicants who selected Business as 
their first choice major but were not admitted under the Ten Percent Plan. This 
meant Fisher’s class rank of 12% and her AI score of 3.1 was significantly lower 
than many applicants to the Business major who were students ranked between the 
top 5% and 10% of their graduating class. Fisher’s situation was similar with respect 
to the Liberal Arts major. The cutoff for automatic admission as a UT Liberal Arts 
major was an AI score of 3.9 or higher. Here again, Fisher’s AI score of 3.1 did not 
make her particularly competitive. 
 Given the explicit mathematical limitations on the weight that race could 
have on any applicant’s PAI score and the decision grid coordinate location 
limitations on the impact an applicant’s PAI score could have on whether he or she 
was ultimately admitted, the Fisher case presented a novel legal question that the 
Court treated with its traditional presumption that any race-conscious policy is 
necessarily a racial classification. When a government policy is, first, only facially 
very minimally race conscious as well as adopted for a racially inclusive purpose and, 
second, the plaintiff presents no evidence that the challenged policy has had a 
racially disparate impact on the racial group to which the plaintiff belongs, the Court 
should reexamine its current approach of presuming such a policy constitutes a 
racial classification. 
B. High Doctrinal Hurdle Imposed on Traditional Discrimination Claims 
The amount of weight UT’s holistic review process gives to SAT scores is 
unlikely to be scientifically justified given that SAT scores only explain 13% of the 
variation in high school students’ first-year college grades.114 Other admissions  
criteria, particularly high school GPA, explain more of the variation in first-year 
college grades, are equally-available, and would likely result in a less racially disparate 
impact on African American and Latino applicants.115 Since as much as 87% of the 
 
 114. Because the SAT test, considered alone, explains only approximately 13% of the variation 
in a test-taker’s college grades, it leaves 87% of the difference in freshman grades “unaccounted for and 
unexplained by consideration of applicants’ SAT score by itself.” Kimberly West-Faulcon, More 
Intelligent Design: Testing Measures of Merit, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1235, 1264–68 (2011); see also West-
Faulcon, The River Runs Dry, supra note 85, at 1116 (explaining that the SAT explains an additional 
13% of the variance in first-year college grades as compared to the predictive power of relying on 
applicants’ high school grades alone). 
 115. “At the end of the roughly hundred-year period that mass-marketed standardized tests 
have been in existence, their predictive power still leaves substantial room for improvement.” Far from 
perfect in its prediction, the 13% power of predicting first-year college GPA based on SAT score and 
the 23% predictive power of using SAT score combined with high school GPA to predict the same 
early college outcome is helpful but not complete information for universities to use in assessing the 
academic merit of applicants. See West-Faulcon, More Intelligent Design, supra note 115, at 1264–69 
(examining modern innovation in mental testing in light of the fact that conventional standardized tests 
like the SAT “leave more of the variation in intelligence and future academic success unexplained than 
they actually explain”). Richard Atkinson is the former president of the University of California and an 
expert in cognitive science and psychology. During his presidency, Atkinson gave a speech critical of 
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variation in freshman-year college grades is explained by non-SAT factors,116 racial 
disparities in selection stemming from over-reliance on SAT scores likely require 
justification under disparate impact law.117 
If one of the many African American and Latino applicants denied admission 
the year Fisher applied had sought to challenge his or her rejection as violating the 
Equal Protection Clause because UT’s holistic review process inappropriately over-
relied on SAT scores, the Court’s current doctrine imposes an evidentiary burden 
on traditional discrimination plaintiffs—the discriminatory purpose requirement—
that essentially dooms their claim from the outset.118 The purpose requirement 
imposed on such traditional discrimination plaintiffs, but not reverse discrimination 
plaintiffs, is a nearly impenetrable barrier to traditional race discrimination claims.119 
The reasons it is difficult to prove racially discriminatory purpose include: (1) the 
fact that perpetrators of purposeful race discrimination are increasingly 
sophisticated in camouflaging it with facially race neutral explanations,120 (2) that 
much of modern race discrimination is the product of implicit or unconscious racial 
bias,121 and (3) that many decision-making systems rely on racially-skewed 
standardized test results in a scientifically unjustified, but not purposefully racially 
discriminatory, manner.122 
 As noted in Justice Samuel Alito’s Fisher II dissent,123 questions about the  
predictive value and potential racial bias in how UT holistic review relied upon SAT 
 
the amount of weight placed on SAT scores in college admissions and announced plans to no longer 
require students applying to take the SAT I. See Richard C. Atkinson, President, Univ. of Cal., 
Standardized Tests and Access to American Universities, The 2001 Robert H. Atwell Distinguished 
Lecture at the 83rd Annual Meeting of the American Council on Education (Feb. 18, 2001), http://
www.ucop.edu/news/sat/speech.html [https://perma.cc/MLR5-YQTN]. 
116. See West-Faulcon, More Intelligent Design, supra note 115, at 1268. 
117. Id. at 1291 (describing potential claims by “such rejected African-American and Latino 
applicants [who] could file Title VI disparate impact complaints with the Department of Education 
Office of Civil Rights”). 
118. See Davis, 426 U.S. 229; Feeney, 442 U.S. 256. 
119. Most challenges of a racial classification under the Equal Protection Clause decided by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the last forty years have been reverse discrimination claims. See, e.g., Fisher II, 
136 S. Ct. 2198; Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411; Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265; DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321–22 (1987) (describing 
this pattern). 
 120. See id. 
 121. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the 
Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010). 
   122. See West-Faulcon, More Intelligent Design, supra note 115, at 1269; see also West-Faulcon 
Fisher I Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 19–20 (discussing the predictive limitations of the SAT scores 
and contrasting them with more predictive and less racially skewed standardized tests based on more 
accurate theories of intelligence). 
 123. Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in Fisher II actually focuses heavily on the role that SAT 
scores play in UT’s holistic review and even connects the SAT-driven nature of UT’s holistic review 
with the exclusion of African American and Latino applicants. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2227 n.5.  
However, it should be noted that Alito includes this discussion in service of his overarching, incorrect 
claim that UT’s race-consciousness in holistic review racially discriminates against Asian American  
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scores warrant consideration.124 Alito scrutinizes UT’s use of SAT scores to  
challenge the university’s assertion that it needed to be race conscious in order to 
admit African American and Latino high school students with high SAT scores. 
Although Justice Alito only discusses the SAT to demonstrate why Abigail Fisher’s 
reverse discrimination claim should have succeeded,125 it is worth noting that Alito’s 
SAT discussion in Fisher II illuminates the doctrinal implications of the Court’s 
reversed equal protection jurisprudence as well as the types of racially disparate 
impacts that stem from over-reliance on SAT scores. 
 Alito’s Fisher II dissent challenges whether UT needs to use SAT scores and 
whether using them racially discriminates against African American and Latino  
applicants to support his view that UT failed to proffer a compelling purpose for 
its use of race. However, had Alito been analyzing the claim of a rejected African 
American applicant who contended UT’s over-reliance on the SAT violated her 
equal protection rights, the Court’s equal protection doctrine would have warranted 
only rational basis review,126 according to Washington v. Davis precedent.127 Under 
weak rational basis review, Justice Alito would no doubt accept UT’s contention 
that it needed to maximize SAT scores and thereby reject the African American 
applicant’s discrimination claim. By contrast, under the stringent strict scrutiny 
review automatically afforded to reverse discrimination claimants without regard to 
whether race actually affected white applicants, Alito was no doubt willing to use 
strict scrutiny to doctrinally second-guess UT’s claim that it needed to maximize 
SAT scores. Ironically,128 Alito invoked the notion that UT’s reliance on SAT scores 
 
applicants to UT. Id. As the analysis in Figures 1-4 and Table 1 show clearly, there is no empirical 
support for Justice Alito’s assertions regarding massive discrimination against Asian Americans. 
 124. Alito does so to support his claim that UT’s interest in intraracial diversity or “diversity 
within diversity” is not a compelling interest. Id. at 2238 (Alito, J., dissenting). Alito’s opinion is replete 
with bald assertions that Asian Americans were the victims of racial discrimination based on no 
statistical evidence of the rate at which Asian Americans were admitted. Id. at 2209, 2218, 2223–27. 
125. In other words, my use of Alito’s SAT critique herein is vastly different from his own. 
Alito’s opinion paints UT as an institution that racially discriminates against Asian Americans, a claim 
that is inconsistent with the data presented in Figures 1–4 above. Id. at 2223–27. Here, I reference 
Alito’s observations about the SAT as the type of claims a rejected African American or Latino applicant 
might rely upon in challenging UT’s holistic review as racially discriminating against his or her race. 
Even though Justice Alito explicitly rejects “maximizing admittees’ SAT scores” as a compelling 
government interest and distinguishes UT’s interest in high SAT scores from UT’s true compelling 
interest “in admitting students who will achieve academic success,” id. at 2234, he only does so in service 
of Fisher’s reverse discrimination claim. 
 126. See Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111–17 (1949) (setting forth the Court’s 
highly deferential rational basis standard of review). 
 127. In Washington v. Davis, the Court deferred to the District of Columbia’s use of a test that 
rejected African American applicants claimed was not job-related. Davis, 426 U.S. at 288 (applying 
rational basis review to reject claim of African American applicants contending test use to select police 
officers was not “job-related”). 
 128. While Justice Alito finds it “more than a little ironic” that UT asserts a compelling interest 
in considering race so as to admit African American and Latino applicants with high SAT scores, Alito’s 
invocation of the fact that the SAT has “often been accused of reflecting racial and cultural bias” against 
African Americans and Latinos to explain why he would have ruled in favor of a white applicant 
claiming race discrimination is itself quite ironic. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2234, 2234 n.11 (citing Roy  
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could be biased against African Americans and Latinos to support Abigail Fisher’s 
claim of anti-white bias. 
Thus, despite the evidence of racially discriminatory effect on African 
American and Latino applicants shown in Table 1,129 the Court’s requirement that 
traditional equal protection plaintiffs prove discriminatory purpose operates to 
absolve UT of any obligation to justify it systematically lower acceptance rates for 
those groups.130 The upshot is that the Court’s reversed equal protection doctrine 
permits Abigail Fisher’s equal protection challenge to proceed, irrespective of her 
admissions-related merit and irrespective of the fact that race played no role in 
Fisher’s rejection. The fact that UT’s holistic review had a racially disparate impact 
on African Americans and Latinos, that UT’s holistic review relied very heavily on 
SAT scores, and that UT’s holistic review made SAT scores determinative of 
admission in a manner unlikely to be scientifically justifiable would be doctrinally 
insufficient to trigger the plaintiff-friendly strict scrutiny standard of review were a 
rejected African American or Latino applicant to sue UT for violating the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
C. Justice Kennedy’s Continued Empathy for Reverse Discrimination 
Claims and Claimants 
Although Justice Kennedy observed in Inclusive Communities that “mere  
awareness of race” in attempting to solve a problem “does not doom the endeavor 
at the outset,”131 he has long had concerns about “the dangers” presented by  
government use of “individual [racial] classifications.”132 In rejecting Abigail 
 
O. Freedle, Correcting the SAT’s Ethnic and Social-Class Bias: A Method for Reestimating SAT Scores, 
73 HARV. ED. REV. 1 (2003)). 
 129. See supra Table 1. 
 130. Under the Court’s reversed equal protection jurisprudence, empirically-substantiated race 
impacts in death penalty sentences were reviewed under the weak rational basis standard. See McCleskey, 
481 U.S. at 297–99. 
 131. In Tex. Dep’t. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project Inc., Justice  
Kennedy explicitly rejected the notion that government race-consciousness is a per se constitutional or 
statutory violation when observed that “race may be considered in certain circumstances and in a proper 
fashion” and “mere awareness of race” in attempting to solve a problem “does not doom that endeavor 
at the outset.” 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2015). UT’s holistic review policy evidently satisfied Kennedy’s 
requirement that government refrain from race consciousness such that an individual may “find his 
own identify, can define her own persona, without state intervention that classifies on the basis of his 
race or the color of her skin.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551  
U.S. 701, 797 (2007). 
  132. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In Fisher I, 
Kennedy criticized the lower court for being too deferential in its application of the strict scrutiny 
standard. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. It is beyond the scope of this Article to challenge Justice Kennedy’s 
application of strict scrutiny to the race consciousness of UT’s admissions policy, although I believe 
there is a strong argument to be made that the minimal consideration of race employed by the institution 
does not warrant treatment as a racial classification warranting the application of strict scrutiny. See, e.g., 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265; West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry, supra note 85, at 1153–54 (describing Powell’s 
observation that race consciousness for the purpose of ameliorating the effects of racially unfair 
admissions criterion need not be treated as racial classifications subject to strict scrutiny). 
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Fisher’s claim, Kennedy observed near the end of the Fisher II opinion that “it  
remains an enduring challenge to our Nation’s education system to reconcile the 
pursuit of diversity with the constitutional promise of equal treatment and  
dignity.”133 With this statement, Kennedy frames race-conscious efforts to increase 
racial diversity as a threat to white equal treatment and dignity,134 even though he is 
acutely aware that UT’s race consciousness had no demonstrable negative impact 
on white applicants. Thus, in an opinion upholding a racial affirmative action policy, 
Kennedy reveals that he continues to make rejected white plaintiffs, even those with 
less than stellar credentials like Abigail Fisher, the central benefactors of the 
“constitutional promise” of the Equal Protection Clause.135 
No evidence was presented in the Fisher litigation that demonstrated that UT’s 
minimal race consciousness136 decreased white or Asian American rates of selection 
or, for that matter, increased African American and Latino rates of selection.137 
Although Justice Kennedy observed that race was a “meaningful factor that can 
make a difference in the evaluation of a student’s application,”138 he only supported 
this statement with UT student enrollment data, not the selection rate data that is 
set forth in Part I of this Article.139 Kennedy failed to recognize the empirical reality 
that UT’s holistic review had three attributes that warranted the judicial deference 
that accompanies the more defendant-friendly rational basis and intermediate 
scrutiny standards of review. First, UT’s holistic review was only very minimally race 
conscious; second, UT’s holistic review was facially heavily reliant on SAT scores, 
and; third, the overwhelming majority of holistic review admission slots went to 
whites and did so at twice the selection rate for African Americans and Latinos.140     
Fisher II’s treatment of UT’s holistic review as a racial classification and its 
default application of strict scrutiny analysis exemplify the reversed equal protection 
doctrine I critique here. The Court applies its most rigorous protection to Abigail 
Fisher’s claim even though there is good reason to suspect UT’s lower admission 
 
   133. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214. 
 134. Id. 
       135. Id. 
 136. The Court was correct to note that “it is not a failure of narrow tailoring for the impact 
of racial consideration to be minor.” Id. at 15. 
 137. In its Fisher II Supreme Court brief, UT responded to Fisher’s claim that its race conscious 
admissions process had minimal impact on its admission of African American and Latino applicants by 
pointing to increases in enrollment, not admission rates. Brief for Respondents at 8, Fisher II, No. 14-
CV-981 [hereinafter Fisher II Brief for Respondents] (“[B]y 2007, the number of enrolled African-
American students admitted through holistic review had nearly doubled from 2004, climbing from 3.6% 
of the holistic class in 2004 to 6.8% in 2007. SJA 157a. Enrollment of Hispanic students likewise 
increased.”). Similarly, UTs observation that “20% of all African-Americans students offered admission 
to the 2008 class, and 15% of all Hispanic students, were admitted through holistic review,” id. at 11, 
ignores my analysis in Figure 4 which shows the percentage of white students admitted through holistic 
review was significantly higher—32.5%. See supra Figure 4. 
 138. Brief for Respondents, supra note 29, at 10 (citing Petitioner Appendix at 281a and 180a). 
139. See supra Part I. The Court’s discussion of this point mirrored UT’s reliance on Petitioner’s 
description of UT’s policy and enrollment, not admissions data. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212. 
140. See supra Figure 1. 
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rates for African American and Latino students are the result of inappropriate over-
reliance on SAT scores in UT’s holistic review. Kennedy’s vote to uphold UT’s 
holistic review is far from a harbinger of a more affirmative-action-friendly 
Kennedy jurisprudence. As striking as Kennedy’s vote against Abigail Fisher was as 
a deviation from his past votes in affirmative action cases,141 the Fisher II case does 
not reveal any cognizable shift in the Court’s or Kennedy’s hyper-empathy for 
reverse discrimination claimants. Instead, Kennedy’s treatment of UT holistic 
review as a racial classification warranting strict scrutiny reflects the Court’s 
reversed equal protection doctrine.  
For Kennedy, the mere fact that UT’s policy was even minimally race  
conscious was sufficient to treat the policy as a doctrinal threat to whites—a racial 
classification warranting strict scrutiny review.142 Based on little more than the fact 
that the doctrine is now “well established,”143 Kennedy has remained committed to 
treating any and all race consciousness challenged by a reverse discrimination 
plaintiff as a racial classification. He has expressed the view that “there is simply no 
way of determining” whether “race-based measures” are motivated by a desire to 
be racially inclusive or “motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or  
simple racial politics.”144 However, Kennedy has never confronted the theoretical 
incoherence of holding the view that the Supreme Court lacks the capacity to 
determine whether a policy is motivated by inclusive purpose or invidious  
purpose if the policy is facially race-conscious yet viewing the Court as possessing 
that very capacity if the policy in question is facially race-neutral.145 The empirical 
analysis in Part I of this Article offers a concrete method by which the Court can 
 
141. For Kennedy, the combination of Fisher’s lower SAT score and UT Austin’s heavy reliance 
on such scores demonstrates that Fisher did not have the “high, and justified, expectation[ ],” Ricci, 557 
U.S. at 593, of admission that she would need in order to persuade Justice Kennedy that race 
predominated the decision not to admit her. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2433; Ricci, 557 U.S. at 627; see also 
Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts 
Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653, 654 (2015) (“[T]he [Roberts] Court has demonstrated that government 
may change the selection standards in competitive processes without triggering strict scrutiny if the 
government acts (1) with a race-conscious goal of promoting equal opportunity; (2) the government 
requires a selection standard that is appropriate for the context; and (3) the standard does not classify 
individuals by race.”); Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court 2012 Term Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 45 (2013) (arguing that “[t]he justifications for strict scrutiny in affirmative action 
cases no longer emphasize the importance of protecting innocent victims of affirmative action,” but 
rather focus on constraining uses of race in order to “protect[ ] expectations of fair dealing that citizens 
have in interacting with the government”). 
 142. In Fisher I, he admonished the Court of Appeals for not being strict enough in its  
application of strict scrutiny. See 133 S. Ct. at 2433. 
   143. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and  
concurring in the judgment) (noting that it is well established that when a governmental policy is  
subjected to strict scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving that racial classifications are 
“narrowly tailored” measures that further compelling governmental interests) (citing Johnson  
v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505 (2005)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. C.f., Ian Haney-Lopez, Intentional Blindness, N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1784 (2012) 
(“Colorblindness denies that the state’s purposes can be discerned; intent doctrine demands proof of 
malicious purpose”). 
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indeed distinguish between race-conscious admissions practices that warrant 
doctrinal treatment as a racial classification and race-conscious policies, like UTs 
holistic review, so meek they still manage to advantage whites and thus should not 
trigger strict scrutiny. 
While there could, in theory, come a time when it would be difficult for the 
Court to determine whether a university added a race-conscious component to its 
admissions policy to disproportionally exclude whites based on a theory of white 
inferiority because it viewed whites as racially inferior, this was obviously not the 
scenario in Fisher II.146 The race consciousness employed by selective American 
universities today is, at best, diversity-motivated and, at worst, motivated by a desire 
to maximize SAT scores without replacing standardized test scores with equally 
effective but less racially skewed admission criteria.147 
Applying equal protection analysis in a reversed manner—favoring claims by 
whites, a racial group that has not been the victim of historical race discrimination 
in America, over the claims of nonwhites—results in a doctrinal empathy for  
reverse race discrimination claims and a doctrinal apathy for traditional race  
discrimination claims.148 The Court should find this double standard untenable. The 
facts in Fisher II—a race-conscious policy touted as racial affirmative action that 
confers a white admissions advantage being challenged by a white applicant rejected 
for non-racial reasons—is a scenario likely to be presented to the Court in a future 
legal challenge. In fact, Kennedy’s decision to treat UT’s holistic review as a racial 
classification without discussion will likely embolden more rejected white and Asian 
American applicants to sue universities over facially race-conscious admissions 
policies even when the race consciousness had no negative impact on their 
admission.149  
The Court should adopt a doctrinal rule that discourages a parade of future 
equal protection claims like Fisher’s. Under this new rule, reverse discrimination 
claimants like Fisher whose lawsuits are based solely on claim to a race-blindness 
entitlement,150 not a merit-driven claim, would be required to present evidence that 
the race-conscious policy they seek to challenge had a cognizable exclusionary effect 
 
 146. UT did not add race consciousness to its holistic review because the institution harbored 
the view that whites are racially inferior, nor does its minimal race consciousness disproportionately 
exclude white applicants at any stage. The reality is that UT is not many decades removed from an 
explicit legal regime that endorsed a Jim Crow racial hierarchy with whites at the top as racially superior 
to nonwhites. The racial composition of UT’s undergraduate campus was all-white under Jim Crow 
laws and whites have been the most well-represented racial group at UT since then. See, e.g., Sweatt  
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950). 
   147. Cf. West-Faulcon Fisher I Amicus Brief, supra note 14 at 27–29 (explaining theoretical 
deficiencies in traditional g-based standardized test and greater predictive power and smaller racial skew 
of tests based on more accurate, modern theories of intelligence). 
 148. See, e.g., Davis, 426 U.S. at 242–46 (discussing Palmer v. Thompson and the requirement 
that plaintiffs prove discriminatory effect of policy challenged under the Equal Protection Clause). 
   149. See, e.g., Complaint, Students for Fair Admissions Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., No. 1:14-CV-
00954, 2017 WL 213940 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 2017); Complaint, Students for Fair Admissions,  
Inc. v. President of Harvard Coll., No. 14.-CV-14176, 2015 WL 3683230 (D. Mass. June 15, 2015). 
   150. See generally West-Faulcon, Forsaking Claims of Merit, supra note 6. 
First to Printer_West-Faulcon (Do Not Delete) 9/19/2017  9:06 AM 
164 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:133 
on whites.151 The current untenable doctrinal double standard could be resolved by 
requiring reverse discrimination claimants to demonstrate race has had some 
empirically verifiable impact on the outcomes of the admissions policy at issue in 
order to constitute a racial classification triggering strict scrutiny. Doctrinally, 
reverse discrimination claimants should be required to prove racially discriminatory 
impact.152 Otherwise, the Court will no doubt be faced with deciding more reverse 
discrimination claims “gone wild.”153 
CONCLUSION 
The equal protection doctrine the Court has developed in affirmative action 
cases over the past four decades has lost its logical connection to its articulated goal 
of protecting non-beneficiary races from the harms of racial affirmative action. 
Kennedy’s unquestioned application of strict scrutiny to rejected white applicant 
Abigail Fisher’s equal protection challenge of an admissions policy that selected 
whites at twice the rate it selected African Americans and Latinos indicates the 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is no longer tethered to correcting racialized 
harm. While the outcome in Fisher II was cause for celebration by proponents of 
racial affirmative action, the doctrinal rule—strict scrutiny—applied by the Court 
shows Justice Kennedy remains tied to a reversed theory of equal protection that is 
intensely sensitive to concerns of reverse discrimination and remains unwelcoming 
to the application of equal protection limits to facially race-neutral policies that 
unjustifiably exclude African Americans and Latinos. 
Contrary to Abigail Fisher’s claim that UT’s holistic review process constituted 
reverse discrimination against her, this Article has presented admissions rate analysis 
that shows that white students evaluated under UT’s race-conscious holistic review 
were admitted at a higher rate than all other racial groups—22.3%. This was more 
than double the admission rate for Latino and African American applicants and the 
racial disparity in selection was so large that it likely constitutes prima facie evidence 
of Title VI disparate impact discrimination against African Americans and Latinos, 
particularly when considered in light of the heavy weight UT’s holistic review gave 
to SAT scores.  
 Giving such a high degree of reverse discrimination judicial scrutiny to an 
admissions policy that selected white students twice as often as African American 
 
   151. Cf. Robinson, supra note 10, at 184 (considering “how radically different the law would 
be” if Abigail Fisher “had to establish not that Texas applied a racial classification, but that Texas 
harbored animus toward white people”).  
   152. The Court has never required reverse discrimination plaintiffs to demonstrate racially  
discriminatory effect against members of their racial group. See, e.g., Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198; Fisher I, 
133 S. Ct. 2411; Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469; Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265. My point here is that a lesson to be taken from the Fisher litigation is that the Court should 
start doing so. Justice Kennedy discussed the lack of evidence that UT’s race conscious had a negative 
impact on Fisher’s rejection but never suggested that fact should have a doctrinal consequence. 
   153. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2232 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing UT’s holistic review  
admissions policy as affirmative action “gone wild”). 
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and Latino students puts the Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause 
at war with the original purpose of the clause—protecting the victims of racial 
subjugation. This makes Fisher II emblematic of the perverse results of the reversing 
of equal protection. Although it ultimately upholds UT’s holistic review as 
constitutional, Kennedy’s application of strict scrutiny in Fisher II exalts the reverse 
discrimination claims of whites and makes no mention of how poorly African 
Americans and Latinos fared under holistic review compared to whites and Asian 
Americans. Requiring reverse discrimination plaintiffs to demonstrate a policy’s 
cognizable group-based racialized impact in order to trigger strict scrutiny would be 
an important first step in righting the Court’s enduring equal protection reversal. 
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